

Dimensions and types of policy networks

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Abstract. The paper offers a refined and systematic concept of state-business relations based on the 'policy network' idea. The major dimensions of policy networks are presented as (1) number and type of actors, (2) function of networks, (3) structure, (4) institutionalization, (5) rules of conduct, (6) power relations, (7) actor strategies. Certain popular conventional policy making arrangements (e.g. sectoral corporation, sponsored pluralism, clientelism) are examined in terms of the network dimensions.

The concept of policy network

There are substantial differences in relations between state agencies and organizations of civil society – between nations, policy fields, as well as economic sectors. This variation has become conventional wisdom in the literature and the differences have been given various labels. A popular distinction has been that between weak and strong states – regarding their interventions in civil society, especially the economy (e.g. Nettl, 1968; Dyson, 1983; Badie and Birnbaum, 1983). Another one is the differentiation made by Katzenstein (1985: 20) between 'three dominant political forms of contemporary capitalism', which refer to various ways in which the state interacts with the economy: liberalism in the US and Britain; statism in Japan and France; and corporatism in the small European states and, to a lesser extent, in West Germany. Furthermore, many authors have formulated differences in state-industry relations in terms of the degree of corporatism, that is, the degree of integrated participation by economic interest groups in the public policy process. Quite a few rank-orderings of countries on scales of corporatism have been made (Wilensky, 1976; Schmitter, 1981; Lehmbruch, 1982 and 1984; Schmidt, 1982; Olsen, 1983; Czada, 1983; Wilson, 1985).

Most of these typologies are rather crude labels. In this paper I will try to develop a more refined concept of state-business relations by identifying various dimensions thereof, which can then be used to distinguish various types of state-business relations from one another. There is more than enough literature to base such an undertaking on, and consequently, what is presented here is more a systematization of this literature than something really new.

Systematization can be aided by the concept of 'policy network', which has gained in popularity over the last years. It seems to have replaced the concept of corporatism as the fashionable catch-phrase in the study of interest group politics. However, the change is more than a fashion change. It is an improvement. Comparisons of countries in terms of the degree of corporatism implied that state-industry relations were selectively viewed through the perspective of corporatism, even in those countries which hardly showed corporatist traits. Here state-industry relations were sometimes forced into the conceptual strait-jacket of corporatism. By using a more general and neutral concept such as 'policy network', corporatism can be considered as being only one type of such network, and compared on 'network dimensions' with other types of state-industry relations found in the literature, such as clientelism, pluralism or 'iron triangles'.

In political science, the concept of network has been used mainly in a general, metaphorical way (Hanf and Scharpf, 1977; Katzenstein, 1978; Heclo, 1978; Lehmbruch, 1984, 1989a), as a model or 'image' (Jordan, 1981) of reality. This contrasts with sociometric network analysis, where detailed concepts, variables and measurement criteria have been developed (Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Kriesi, 1980; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Pappi, 1987; Laumann and Knoke, 1987).

Some authors have used the concept to generally designate state-industry relations. Katzenstein used the concept as a general characterization of the links between 'the public and the private sector in the implementation of policy'. Lehmbruch (1984) applied the term 'networks' to link parties to corporatist concertation. He spoke of 'networks of interconnected organizations, comprising the economic peak associations, government, the public administration, and the parties in parliament. Interconnections can be established through such "junction points" as joint committees or, more durably, through overlapping memberships, in particular at the leadership level' (1984: 74).

Heclo (1978), however, has used the concept of 'issue network' to denote a specific type of public-private linkage, involving a great many actors, especially with expert knowledge, rather than as an overarching term for state-industry relations. He presented it as an alternative for the 'disastrously incomplete' concept of 'iron triangle', used as a model for state-industry relations in the US in the 1950s and 1960s. While iron triangles are characterized by closure and segmentation, issue networks are open and fragmented. They are informal, intricate and unstable webs with an unlimited number of participants. There is no central authority or power centre and decisionmaking is difficult as the issue networks are better suited to increasing rather than decreasing complexity of issues. Somewhat earlier, the concept has been used in a similar way in

German implementation research and studies of 'Politikverflechtung' (Hanf and Scharpf, 1977).

I prefer using the concept of 'policy network', following Katzenstein and Lehmbruch, in the more general sense as an overarching characterization of public-private relations. After all, iron triangles, clientelism, or formalized corporatism are also structured as networks. 'Issue networks' as described by Heclo are then only one type of policy network, and different from the ones just mentioned.

Typical for all these types of state-industry relations is a more enduring linkage pattern based on an interdependence of the various actors: politicians, bureaucrats and interest representatives. Administrators need political support, legitimacy, information, coalition partners in their competition with other sections of the bureaucracy, and assistance in the implementation of policy. Interest groups on the other hand desire access to public policy formation and implementation, and concessions in their interests or those of their constituency. These different needs motivate and produce exchanges or transactions. When repeated often these exchanges may become institutionalized in network structures. Such network structures constrain the successive options open to the actors – and in time may even influence the structure of the participating organizations.

Being institutionalized channels for transactions, networks can be studied using transaction-costs economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Just as with contracts and 'hierarchies' (organizations, in the terminology of transaction-costs economics), interdependent actors form networks to reduce their 'transaction costs'. Interest groups save costs of repeated efforts to gain access and influence by building a more permanent relation of trust and resource dependence. Administrators on the other hand save on costs of information collection and efforts to acquire assistance and cooperation. The emergence, structure and stability of the network depends on the conditions, identified in transaction costs economics, for forming organizations: bounded rationality, fear of opportunistic behaviour, economic and strategic uncertainty, frequency of transactions, asset specificity (uniqueness of resources), and small numbers.

Networks are a form of proto-organization, or 'loosely coupled' organization. They are an intermediate form between (a single) contract ('market') and formal organizations – and some could develop into such formal organizations. Networks differ from organizations by degree of formalization of relations and by type of coordination. Networks do not necessarily have a power centre, and hence coordination is not by hierarchic authority (or, in more enlightened form hierarchic consultation) but by horizontal bargaining. Heclo (1978) and Hanf and Scharpf (1977) have even maintained that it is not possible to locate a centre of decision making in policy networks.

Dimensions of policy networks

Having defined the concept in a general way as more institutionalized exchange relations between state and (organizations of) civil society, it is necessary to distinguish a number of dimensions of such networks in order to make the concept fruitful as a tool for comparative analysis.

In doing so, one can build upon an earlier attempt by Atkinson and Coleman (1989). Although theirs is a very interesting approach, it does have a number of deficiencies. They in turn elaborate on ideas of Katzenstein (1978) who identified as the crucial variables for the establishment of policy networks the measure of centralization of state and of society and the degree of differentiation between the two (in other words the autonomy of the state vis-a-vis interest groups). Atkinson and Coleman list a number of criteria for state autonomy, for concentration of state authority, and for centralization of the interest system ('mobilization of business interests'). These variables are then used as dimensions of an eight-fold table, in which the various types of state-industry relations known from the literature, such as corporatism, macro-corporatist concertation, clientela and parentela pluralism, are placed.

One shortcoming of their approach is that it remains unclear whether the variables they use for their table are conditions for or properties of networks. It seems to me that centralization of state and interest groups are more conditions, whereas the autonomy of the state is a property of state-industry networks. Autonomy refers to the power balance within the network. Another point of critique is the absence of the variable 'actor strategies'. Their model is limited to structures. Thirdly, they omit some interesting types of state-industry relations, such as the 'issue networks' of Heclo or the informal network structures created by movement of personnel between the public and private sector, known in France as 'pantouflage'. Finally, in their description of the individual types of policy networks, they do not systematically list dimensions and properties of policy networks which would enable a systematic comparison of types. Hence I believe this interesting approach could still be improved upon.

Different dimensions of policy networks are more or less explicitly present in the literature, especially that of the sociometric approach, which has gone much further than political science in developing analytical concepts and criteria for measurement. Major dimensions of policy networks are: (1) actors, (2) function, (3) structure, (4) institutionalization, (5) rules of conduct, (6) power relations and (7) actor strategies.

Actors

A first subdimension under the category 'actors' is of course the *number* of participants. This determines the size of the network. Furthermore, the character of the policy network is strongly influenced by the *type* of actors involved. Actors in policy networks are of course individuals, but as these are mostly members in the role of organization-representative, the network actors can also be considered organizations. In some cases however, such as Heclo's 'issue networks', membership tends to be on a personal basis. Heclo even perceives a 'dissolving of organized politics' in the US (1978: 89) as expertise, often a property of individuals, gains in importance. As far as organization members are concerned, by definition policy networks involve state agencies – whether political or administrative – and at least some organizations of civil society. These may be interest associations, political parties or scientific organizations, either sector-specific or transsectoral.

The characteristics of these actors, although not part of the network, are certainly relevant for the attributes of the networks as explanatory variables. Relevant actor-properties are: their needs and interests, which form the basis of the interdependencies and give rise to the network structure in the first place; the structures, capacities, resources and performances of government and societal organizations; the degree of professionalization, that is, the training and recruitment patterns of organization-representatives such as state bureaucrats; and their mandate, role conception (for example as 'public' servants) and attitudes.

Function

Networks are channels of communication, which may perform various functions, alone or simultaneously. These functions depend on the needs, intentions, resources and strategies of the actors involved. Network structures do not have goals of their own. The actors, however, do and, depending on these, the network acquires various functions. Thus the concept of 'function' forms the bridge between the 'structure' and 'actor' perspective on networks. The most common functions of 'policy networks' are, in order of increasing intensity of relationship:

- channeling access to decisionmaking processes;
- consultation, or exchange of information;
- negotiation, that is, exchange of resources and/or performances, or, seen from a different perspective, resource mobilization;
- coordination of otherwise independent action;
- cooperation in policy formation, implementation and legitimation.

All these are likely to have also the intended or unintended function of advancing the acquaintance of mutual positions, interests and problems, and of breeding mutual confidence, trust and understanding. A significant variable is furthermore the broadness of policy issues involved. The greater the issue variety, the more complex the exchanges will be. The type of function depends sometimes on the nature of the relationship. Thus negotiation presupposes conflict or competition.

There is a well-known basic distinction between lobbying on the one hand and concertation (a combination of consultation and coordination) and cooperation on the other. Lobbying or pressure group activity is mainly unidirectional: a 'pressure group' tries to get access, understanding for its position, and influence on decisions made by others such as the state. In the case of concertation and cooperation, the societal groups partake in the decisionmaking itself, the mutual interdependency is more symmetric, and hence the relations multidirectional. As Lehmbruch wrote: 'Die Einflußvektoren kehren sich – im Vergleich zum klassischen pluralistischen Modell der Politik als Vektorsumme – um. Sie verlaufen jetzt, vereinfachend gesprochen, nicht mehr von den 'privaten' Verbänden zu den staatlichen Steuerungszentren, sonder umgekehrt' (1979: 52). However, it must be said that in practice it is not easy to draw the border line between these two main categories. Both lobbying and policy participation may involve exchange and negotiation, that is vectors going in both directions. And even in the case of lobbying, initiatives for contacts may come from the addressee. That is actually the goal of long term lobbying and the indication of its success.

Structure

The structure of policy networks refers to the pattern of relations between actors. Important variables in this category are:

- the size of the network, determined by the number of actors;
- boundaries, which may be open and fluent, or closed and monopolistic;
- type of membership: voluntary or compulsory participation. This determines whether the actors may perceive the network as a problem or an opportunity;
- pattern of linkages: chaotic or ordered;
- intensity or strength of the relation, that is the frequency and duration of interaction;
- density or multiplexity. The extent to which the actors are linked by multiple relations;
- symmetry or reciprocity of interconnections;

- clustering or differentiation in subnetworks;
- linking pattern or type of coordination: hierarchic authority, horizontal consultation and bargaining, overlapping memberships, interlocking leaderships, frequent mobility of personnel from one organization to another;
- centrality: none, pluri-centric (joint committees), or central unit, i.e. a focal organization as policy initiator;
- degree of delegation of decisionmaking competencies to central units and measure of control by network participants;
- nature of the relations: conflictual, competitive or cooperative;
- stability.

Most of these variables are interrelated. Thus the stability is likely to increase with the intensity, multiplexity and symmetry of the interconnections, the presence of a focal organization, and of course compulsory membership; clustering is of course a function of the size of the network; and open boundaries will tend to go together with a chaotic pattern of relations and low intensity and symmetry. Such clusters of structural characteristics will characterize specific types of policy networks.

Institutionalization

One specific structural property which has been singled out for special treatment is the degree of institutionalization. This refers to the formal character of the network structure and its stability. The degree of institutionalization will depend on the structural characteristics of the network. Thus institutionalization will tend to be greater in closed networks, with compulsory membership, ordered linkages, high intensity, multiplexity and symmetry of relationships, overlapping memberships and interlocking leaderships, and with a central policy unit. Several logical 'network-development' stages can be distinguished in between the extremes of a cluster of ad hoc temporary informal relationships in a network without distinct boundaries on the one hand and a full-fledge formal organization on the other hand. Such in-between forms are for example more permanent coalitions between a limited number of actors, networks bound by intermediary organizations such as tripartite committees or semi-public advisory agencies, and formal confederate or federate networks (that is: with a central hierarchic unit of varying degrees of authority).

Rules of conduct

Networks are furthermore characterized by conventions of interaction or

'rules of the game', which govern the exchanges within the network. They stem from the role perceptions, attitudes, interests, social and intellectual-educational background of the participating actors, and are likely to influence these in turn. Indirectly, such conventions will derive from the more general political and administrative culture. Highly institutionalized networks may in addition develop their own 'culture' and conventions, just as organizations do. Some dichotomies of typical conventions in policy networks are:

- an understanding of the relation as adversarial, expectation of opportunism by others, and negotiation between mutually recognized conflicting interests as the normal way to get things done; or a search for consensus, accomodation, and appeasement;
- a shared sense of public interest and general welfare; or an acceptance of following narrow particularistic self-interest;
- secrecy or openness;
- politicization or mutual understanding to depoliticize issues;
- rationalist pragmatism or ideological disputes.

Power relations

Policy networks are also usually power relationships, and are hence characterized by the distribution of power, which is of course a function of the distribution of resources and needs among the actors, and of their mutual organizational structures when these are organizations. Thus power in state-business relations is influenced by the size of the organizations, their degree of centralization or fragmentation, or a representational monopoly. Four types of domination in the state-business relation can be found in the literature:

- capture or colonization of state agencies by business (typical for clientelism);
- autonomy of the state/public administration vis-a-vis organized interests;
- instrumentalization or capture of private interests by the state (an example is state corporatism, which is distinguished from societal corporatism by the fact that the corporatist structures are an instrument of state control (Schmitter, 1974);
- symbiosis, or a relative power balance between both parties within a rather intensive relationship.

A specific distribution of power is not only a characterization of a network, but may also be a motor for structural change – and hence for change in domination – of the network. Thus when one side of the state-business network is monopolized, pressures will develop for monopolization (or monopsonization) on the other side too.

Actor strategies

Actors follow strategies both vis-a-vis networks, and within networks themselves. They create and/or use networks to satisfy their needs, interests and goals, and they develop strategies to manage their interdependencies. Policy networks have been studied until now mainly from the perspective of the private sector and its strategies (Lehmbruch, 1989b). However, they can of course also be studied from the perspective of the state, in particular that of administrative agencies. What policy networks do such agencies create in the context of their intervention policies? And what strategies do they develop regarding existing networks they may find in their policy environment? Such strategies refer to the various already mentioned dimensions of networks. They may entail the selection of actors, the structuring of relations, the provision of functions, and the creation or nurturing of certain conventions.

Strategy is often structure building. Public administrations tend to solve their problems by modifying existing structures, or creating new ones, whether they be organizations (the administration itself, intermediary organizations or private associations) or networks between organizations. Both are interrelated. Changes in network structure are often brought about by changes in the internal structure of the organizations involved, such as interest associations. 'Structuration' involves first of all the selection (or change) of participating actors, and secondly the shaping of the relations with these actors. The first process, the selection of actors, is of crucial importance, as it influences the shape of the relations with these actors to a large extent. A choice to include both business associations and trade unions will lead to other forms of interaction than a choice to include business associations alone.

The selection of actors or interlocutors may entail, in order of increasing active administrative 'structuration':

- being accessible to private interests, thus in a rather passive way allowing the formation of networks by societal actors;
- recognizing certain organized interests and giving them privileged or even exclusive access and 'biased influence', thus providing them with a competitive advantage over other interests. This is often done by creating intermediary organizations in the network such as semi-state agencies or advisory committees and giving only certain interests a seat on these bodies;
- actively supporting specific organized interests with, for example, monopoly access to selective goods, subsidies, tax breaks, the authority to tax their constituencies, compulsory membership, backing private association rules by public law, other statutory powers, or repression of rival organizations (cf. some examples Keeler, 1981);

- creating (networks of) private organizations or changing their structure, for example, fostering integration by the formation of peak associations.

In addition, administrative agencies can, as network participants, directly try to influence the various characteristics of networks, such as the intensity, multiplexity, symmetry, clustering and centrality of the network, the conventions of interaction, the terms of exchange, and the function of the network: provisions of access, consultation, negotiation, coordination or cooperation. In particular, state agencies may shape relations by formally or informally involving interest groups in the formation and implementation of public policy, or by cooperating with them in partial selfregulation of their domain.

Such network structuration may serve various goals of the administrative agency. First and most directly of course the official intervention tasks. The degree and type of intervention will determine the needs for information and assistance and hence the properties of the networks required. Administrations have however in addition other goals which will also influence their structuration strategies. Godfroij (1981) for example distinguished: defense or increase of power; defense or increase of certainty; purposive acceptance of risk; avoidance of power and responsibility; maintenance of established social constructions; and value-oriented action. Moe (1989, 1990) has also stressed the importance of uncertainty reduction, autonomy and future power as major administrative goals in 'structural choice'.

Types of policy networks

These various dimensions are of course interrelated and certain configurations of characteristics together can form a typology. However, policy network typologies have been made many times before. LaPalombara (1964) spoke of *clientela* and *parentela* relations between state and interest groups in his analysis of Italian politics. Schmitter (1974) discussed pluralism, state corporatism, societal corporatism and monism. Cawson (1985) and many others distinguished meso- from macro-corporatism, which Lehmbruch (1984) referred to as sectoral corporatism and (intersectoral) corporatist concertation. Heclo (1978) contrasted iron triangles and issue networks. Peters (1989: 162–75) differentiated legitimate, semi-legitimate (*clientela* and *parentela* relations) and illegitimate relations. And Atkinson and Coleman (1989) discussed various forms of pluralism and corporatism. In the following I will try to characterize these types on the different network dimensions just discussed. Tables 1A–1C provide a summary thereof.

Table 1A. Characteristics of policy networks between state agencies and organized interests, found in the literature.

Policy network type	Statism, Pantouflage	Captured statism	Clientelism	Pressure pluralism
Actors (in addition to state agencies)				
– Number	Very limited	Limited	One	At least 2, usually more
– Type	Mainly state agencies	State agencies, firms	Major interest group	Conflicting interest groups
– Representational monopolies	No	No	Yes	No
Function				
– Channeling access	Not many			
– Consultation	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
– Negotiation	No	Yes	Yes	No
– Coordination	No	Yes	Yes	No
– Cooperation in policy formation	No	Yes	Yes	No
– Cooperation in policy implementation + delegation of public authority	No	No	Usually not	No
– Broadness of policy issues	Broad	Narrow	Narrow	Narrow
Structure				
– Boundaries	Closed	Fluent	Closed	Relatively open
– Type of membership	Involuntary	Voluntary	Voluntary	Voluntary
– Ordered relations?	Low	Low	Medium	Low
– Intensity	Low	Mixed	High	Low
– Multiplexity	Low	Mixed	High	Low
– Symmetry	None	None	Low	Low
– Subclustering?	?	Yes	Possible	Possible
– Linking pattern	Hierarchic authority, interlocking leadership	Hierarchic authority, interlocking leadership	Horizontal consultation, intermobility personnel	Horizontal consultation
– Centrality	High	Low	Medium	Low
– Stability	Low	Low	High	Low
– Nature of relations	Conflictual	Cooperative	Cooperative	Conflictual
Institutionalization	Low	Low	High	Low
Conventions of interaction				
– Adversarialism/consensus-search	Adversial	Both	Both	Adversial
– Idea of serving public interest?	Yes	No	No	No
– Formal or informal contacts	Informal	Informal	Informal	Both formal and informal
– Secrecy?	Yes	No	Yes	No
– Attempts at depoliticization?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
– Ideological disputes?	No	No	No	Possible
Distribution of power				
– Autonomy of state re society	High	Extremely low	Low	Possible
– State dominant	Yes	No	No	Possible
– Societal interests dominant (capture)	No	Yes	Yes	Possible
– Balance, symbiosis	No	No	No	Unlikely
Strategies of public administration				
– Being accessible	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
– Recognition of interest groups	No	Yes, informally	Yes	No
– Active support of interest associations	No	No	Possible	No
– Creation/changing interest associations	No	No	No	No
– Delegation of state authority	No	No	Usually not	No
– Attempts at destroying interest associations	Yes	No	Only competing associations	Possible

Table 1B. Characteristics of policy networks found in the literature.

Policy network type	Sectoral corporatism	Macro corporatism	State corporatism	Sponsored pluralism
Actors (in addition to state agencies)				
- Number	At least 1	At least 2	Several	Many
- Type	Major interest associations	Major interest associations	State-created interest associations	Interest associations
- Representational monopolies	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Function				
- Channeling access	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Consultation	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
- Negotiation	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
- Coordination	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Cooperation in policy formation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Cooperation in policy implementation + delegation of public authority	Yes	Yes	Limited	No
- Broadness of policy issues	Medium	Broad	Narrow-medium	Narrow
Structure				
- Boundaries	Closed	Closed	Closed	Relatively open
- Type of membership	De facto/formal compulsory	De facto/formal compulsory	Formally compulsory	Voluntary
- Ordered relations?	High	High	High	Medium
- Intensity	High	High	Medium	Medium
- Multiplexity	High	High	Medium	Low
- Symmetry	High	High	Low	Low
- Subclustering?	Likely	Likely	Likely	Possible
- Linking pattern	Horizontal consultation	Horizontal consultation	Interlocking leadership	Horizontal consultation
- Centrality	Medium	Medium	High	Low
- Stability	High	High	High	
- Nature of relations	Cooperative	Cooperative	Forced cooperative	Conflictual/cooperative
Institutionalization	High	High	High	Medium
Conventions of interaction				
- Adversarialism/consensus-search	Search for consensus	Search for consensus	Forced consensus	Adversarialism/consensus
- Idea of serving public interest?	No	Yes	Yes, forced	No
- Formal or informal contacts	Formal	Formal	Formal	Formal and informal
- Secrecy?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
- Attempts at depoliticization?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
- Ideological disputes?	Possible	Possible	Not allowed	Possible
Distribution of power				
- Autonomy of state re society	High	High	High	Somewhat
- State dominant	No	No	Yes	No
- Societal interests dominant (capture)	No	No	No	No
- Balance, symbiosis	Likely	Likely	No	Possible
Strategies of public administration				
- Being accessible	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Recognition	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Active support of interest associations	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Creation/changing interest associations	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Delegation of state authority	Yes	Yes	Yes	Possible
- Attempts at destroying interest associations	Possible	Possible	Yes	Possible

Table 1C. Characteristics of policy networks found in the literature.

Policy network type	Parental relations	Iron triangles	'Issue networks'
Actors (in addition to state agencies)			
– Number	Limited	Two	Unlimited, very high
– Type	At least a dominant political party	Interest association + party/parl.ctee	A.o. individual experts
– Representational monopolies	Possible	Yes	No
Function			
– Channeling access	Yes	Yes	Yes
– Consultation	Yes	Yes	Yes
– Negotiation	Possible	Yes	No
– Coordination	Possible	Yes	Possible
– Cooperation in policy formation	Possible	Yes	Yes
– Cooperation in policy implementation + delegation of public authority	No	Usually not	No
– Broadness of policy issues	?	Narrow	Narrow
Structure			
– Boundaries	Relatively closed	Closed	Extremely open
– Type of membership	Voluntary	Voluntary	Voluntary
– Ordered relations?	Low	Medium	Extremely low
– Intensity	Low	High	Mixed
– Multiplexity	Possible	High	Medium
– Symmetry	Low	Low	Diffuse
– Subclustering?	Possible	Possible	Possible
– Linking pattern	Hierarchic authority	Horizontal consultation, intermobility of personnel	Horizontal consultation, intermobility
– Centrality	High, party focal organization	Low	Extremely low
– Stability	Low	High	Extremely low
– Nature of relations	Conflictual and cooperative	Cooperative	Cooperative
Institutionalization	Low	High	Extremely low
Conventions of interaction			
– Adversarialism/consensus-search	Both	Both	Consensus on technocratic norms
– Idea of serving public interest?	No	No	Yes, possible
– Formal or informal contacts	Formal	Informal	Extremely informal
– Secrecy?	No	Yes	No
– Attempts at depoliticization	No	Yes	Yes, turning in technical problems
– Ideological disputes?	Possible	No	No
Distribution of power			
– Autonomy of state re society	High, if party considered state	Low	Low
– State dominant	Yes	No	Diffuse
– Societal interest dominant (capture)	No	Yes	Diffuse
– Balance, symbiosis	No	No	Yes, by collective technocracy
Strategies of public administration			
– Being accessible	Possible	Yes	Yes
– Recognition	Possible	Yes	Yes
– Active support of interest associations	Possible	Possible	No
– Creation/changing interest associations	Possible	No	No
– Delegation of state authority	Possible	Usually not	No
– Attempts at destroying interest associations	Possible	Only of competing associations	No

Statism, pantouflage

An extreme type is that where hardly any relations between state agencies and societal interests exist. In general this presupposes an antagonistic relationship between both, whereby the state consciously tries to exclude organized interests from policy making and policy networks. Two subtypes should be distinguished here, depending on the degree of state intervention in the economy: minimal or strong.

In the first case the state wants to minimize state directives and to leave allocation and regulation of the economy to the market, because this is considered much more effective and efficient. In stead of giving organized interests access or even a place in policymaking and -implementation, the state fights such interests, because they are considered to pervert efficient market allocation. This can either be done by actively trying to destroy already existing organized interests, or by stimulating industries which do not yet have strong interest associations. Goldthorpe (1984: 329) perceived this latter policy approach in Britain and called it a 'dualist strategy': 'the enlargement of certain areas of the economy within which market forces and associated relations of authority and control operate more freely than in others, and in fact in such a way that they compensate for the rigidities that prevail elsewhere.'

The second subtype has often been called *étatisme* or statism: strong state intervention but without the involvement of societal actors. Business is not trusted by state agencies, perhaps because it defends highly particularistic interests (while civil servants have a sense of serving the national interest and have a long term perspective on the development of the economy), because business is poorly organized, or because business associations nurture extreme ideological positions. Eventually, the influence of the state in industry may increase because of nationalization or because of what the French call '*pantouflage*': the departure of civil servants to leading positions in industry while maintaining their relations to and identification with the civil service. Thus industry becomes an extension of the state and relations between civil servants and former civil servants, united through a common culture such as that derived from the French '*grand corps*', may change from adversarial to cooperative.

Captured statism

Instead of former civil servants running industry, state agencies are also sometimes run by (former) businessmen. An example are the so-called '*dollar-*

a-year'-men, who ran the emergency economic administration during the Second World War in Canada and the US (Coleman and Nossal 1991; Hooks 1991). These were businessmen, recruited by the state to organize the wartime economic mobilization, who remained for only one dollar on the payroll of their companies, hence their name. They brought business values, norms, preferences, interests and routine operating procedures in the administration, such as a preference for informal relations, for leaving as much to the market as possible under the crisis-circumstances, and for the legal form of (crown) company when they had to create organizations to delegate tasks to.

Pantouflage and 'dollar-a-year'-men constructions have in common that relations between state and industry are bridged by cross-mobility of personnel who keep the ties to their former organizations, that is, by networks of personal, rather than organizational relations. This linking pattern defines basically the type of network. In both cases these personal relations serve relatively strong intervention. In the case of pantouflage the interests, values, routines of the administration dominate; in the case of 'dollar-a-year'-men those of industry. Hence one could perhaps speak of statism, but run by and serving the direct interests of industry, that is 'captured' statism (cf. Van Waarden, 1991).

Clientelism

Clientelism exists 'when an interest group, for whatever reasons, succeeds in becoming, in the eyes of a given administrative agency, the natural expression and representative of a given social sector which, in turn, constitutes the natural target or reference point for the activity of the administrative agency' (Peters, 1989: 163). This monopoly of representation tends to result in 'capture' or 'colonization' of state agencies by the organized interests. It will make the state agency more dependent on the interest organization, because it does not have the possibility of playing-off interest groups against one another, and it might not have any alternatives for satisfying its needs, for example for information. Moreover, when a sector is organized in only one association instead of many, this one organization will tend to be greater, have more resources, more expertise, and may be a more disciplined organization. Furthermore continuing close cooperation with one association will foster closer social relations and make bureaucrats more sensitive to the needs, problems, world view, etc. of the specific interest group. Thus in the US it has been maintained that the so-called older economic regulatory agencies (Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Aeronautics Board), which have a specific clientele in a limited policy sector, are more prone to capture than the newer

'social' regulatory agencies (Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health Administration), which have a functional mandate and regulate many sectors (a.o. Marcus, 1984: 42).

State agencies involved in a clientelist type of policy network will defend particularistic interests rather than more comprehensive general interests – making public policy into private policy (cf. also Lehmbruch, 1984: 62). This will give them a 'taint of illegality' among the general public (Peters, 1989: 164) and that will produce certain conventions of interaction. There will be a preference for informal mutual recognition, interaction and negotiation, and secrecy and depoliticization will be stressed as the parties have an interest in keeping their relation removed from public scrutiny and accountability.

Clientelism does not necessarily involve delegation of state authority, as Atkinson and Coleman (1989) maintain. On the contrary, the state agency will usually remain responsible for policy formation and implementation, but will heed to the interests of its clientele, with whom strongly institutionalized channels of access exist. In return, it will get support from the clientele in the form of information, compliance and political support in the competition for scarce resources within the government administration.

Clientelism at the agency-level will have two important consequences for state-industry relations at the macro-level. First, the close cooperation of state agency and clientele in pursuing particularistic interests may produce various 'robber coalitions' against other networks of agencies and their clientele, will tend to fragment the state organization, frustrate attempts to formulate policies in the general interest, and will reduce the coherence in general government policy. Thus at the macro-level one finds pluralist competition. Secondly, that is likely to reduce the overall influence of interest organizations in state-industry relations.

Clientelism between bureaucracy and interest group may also extend to legislative committees which oversee the agency. Both often share a same constituency. Then clientelism develops into iron triangles networks.

Pressure pluralism

The concept of pressure pluralism is too familiar to need much elaboration here. It may suffice to point to some of its characteristics: Predominance of pressure-group politics, that is, attempts to gain access and influence; involvement of many competing interests, with no coordination of access attempts; relatively open network boundaries, although no unlimited access; multiple, overlapping, unstructured, unstable and informal network relations with low intensity, multiplexity and centrality; low degree of institutionalization; adversarial type of interaction; politicization.

The presence of several competing interests would in principle mean that they will prevent one another from realizing their interests directly. There is a situation of 'mutual deterrence' (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989: 58, who however reserve this property for corporatism), which could allow a state agency to assume a position of mediator between competing interests, or even of aggregator of these particularistic interests to more general interests, and which may give it 'increased manoeuvring room' (Heclo, 1978: 117), thus augmenting its autonomy. This of course has been the traditional political legitimacy of pluralism. However, whether this is the case will depend on the intervention ambitions of the state, and its own organization structure. As interest pluralism could stimulate internal pluralism within the government administration, agencies might find that ambitions (when they have them) to use the chances for increasing their autonomy are thwarted by other competing state agencies. Thus there is no specific domination relation characteristic for pressure pluralism. Both state agencies and organized interests could dominate.

Parentela relationships

Parentela relations, as distinguished by LaPalombara (1964), involve a dominant political party in the policy network. 'Pressure groups must gain access and legitimacy through their attachment to that particular party rather than through their ability effectively to represent a sector of society.' (Peters, 1989: 167). It occurs in political systems where a single party dominates the state, such as in Italy, Gaullist France or the communist Eastbloc countries. In such systems, the party is strongly identified with the state and it uses the bureaucracy as its instrument (which does not have much autonomy vis-a-vis politics). Hence one could say that this is a case of state domination. However, the interest system too may be an party-instrument, and there have been cases where dominant parties have consciously created systems of interest organizations as an instrument of societal control (for example Spain). In this form it resembles rather closely state corporatism. The latter is distinguished from parentela relations in that policy implementation is delegated to organized interests.

Iron triangles

Iron triangles (cf. a.o. Maass, 1950 and 1951; Lowi, 1979; Adams, 1982; Gais, Peterson and Walker, 1984) also involve party politicians or leading members of parliamentary committees as go-betweens or coalition partners in lobbying relations between a state agency and its clientele. However, the party is not

dominant as in the case of parentela relations. As mentioned, an iron triangle network is an extension of clientelism in the political arena. Therefore it shares many characteristics with clientelism: monopoly representation of interests, that is, closed boundaries (hence the term 'iron' triangle); high intensity, multiplexity, and stability of relations; often symmetrical exchanges (although not necessarily always, as Wilson (1980: 391) has pointed out); search for consensus and cooperation on the basis of mutual complementary interests; important linkages through the movement of personnel between the interest group, parliamentary committee and administrative agency; informality, depoliticization and secrecy as important conventions; domination of societal interests over the state agency ('capture') but autonomy of the 'iron triangle' within politics and administration; resulting in particularism and fragmentation within the state-apparatus.

Issue networks

Issue networks as conceptualized by Heclo (1978) differ in three respects from iron triangles (which Heclo considers 'not so much wrong as well as disastrously incomplete' 1978: 102) and pressure pluralism: they have extremely open boundaries and an in principle unlimited number of participants; the participants are not only and so much interest representatives as well as experts, representing their own personal interest in the maintenance of their expert-image; and they function as a channel for both attempts to get access and influence and for participation in policy formation. In fact, a principal characteristic of these issue networks is that it is difficult to trace the locus of decisionmaking. Hence the dependencies and power relations are diffuse. Insofar as anyone dominates, it is a collective but rather unorganized technocracy.

Sectoral corporatism

Although corporatism is a well-known and often used concept, there is still disagreement as to its precise meaning. Thus Atkinson and Coleman see in their recent paper (1989) the defining characteristic of corporatism that 'an autonomous but divided state seeks to place the onus for decisionmaking in the hands of conflicting socio-economic producer groups' (189: 58). Involvement of conflicting interests is however also a major characteristic of pluralism and by itself does not distinguish both. It is not a necessary element of corporatism, as other authors agree (Schmitter, 1974; Lehmbruch, 1984; Cawson, 1985). The major point in which corporatism differs from clientelism or pluralism is

that interest organizations become involved in policy implementation and acquire some form of public authority in order to aid them in this task. In exchange for cooperation and assistance, state agencies provide interests with certain privileges and resources, among them statutory authority. That is, private interests get to share in the sovereignty of the state. Another major form of state support is privileged access and monopoly recognition. At least if that is still necessary, because a representational monopoly or a highly integrated system of interest associations is often even a precondition for corporatism.

Thus corporatism creates or presupposes a well-organized and integrated system of interest associations (it is even a major element in the definition of Schmitter, 1974). Each interest is likely to be represented by only one organization, and in the case of corporatism at the sector level, this could very well be only one major interest, such as a business' interest association or a Chamber (The historic model of corporatism, by the way, is the pre-eminent societal 'corpus' of the middle ages, the guild, which regulated a sector by itself, but under the supervision of the municipal government).

Assistance in policy implementation increases the mutual dependencies in the network and leads to more symmetrical relations than in clientelism or pluralism. Lehmbruch has already been quoted as saying that in corporatism, the 'vectors' of influence do not only run from interest to state, but also the other way around. Other network characteristics are: high multiplexity, stability and institutionalization of relations, sometimes legal or de facto compulsory membership, centrality, presence of intermediary organizations, search for consensus and depoliticization. There is no clear domination relation although some neo-marxist authors have viewed corporatism as a trick of capital to coopt labour (Panitch, 1979; Jessop, 1978).

Macro-corporatism, intersectoral concertation

Corporatist concertation at the macro-level is distinguished from corporatism by the presence of more than one major interest group. Lehmbruch (1984: 62) has listed the differences as follows:

- 'it involves not just a single organized interest with privileged access to the government but rather a plurality of organizations usually representing antagonistic interests;
- these organizations manage their conflicts and coordinate their action with that of the government expressly in regard to the systemic ('gesamtwirtschaftliche') requirements of the national economy'.

The antagonistic interests do not necessarily have to be capital and labour, but could also be antagonisms such as those between suppliers and customers or

between farmers and the food industry. Although this type of network is found at the macro-level, it is certainly possible that a specialized state agency gets involved or builds such a network. An agency with a functional rather than a sectoral domain, such as a task in social security, health and safety at work or environmental protection develops relations with many sectors and interests, and may have to take account of general systemic interests.

The characteristic property of a corporatist concertation network is thus that it serves to regulate societal conflict. This will have consequences for the interaction in the network. There will be a search for consensus and compromise, and that requires interest aggregation, consultation and bargaining. As compromise is only viable in the long run when the parties involved can guarantee compliance of rank-and-file members, the exchanges also include resources which aid in securing compliance, such as de facto compulsory membership. Thus relations tend to have a high multiplexity and continuity and are likely to be well-institutionalized. State representatives may assume a position of mediator between competing interests and see their autonomy increased. Thus autonomy of the bureaucracy is not only and so much a precondition for corporatist concertation as Atkinson and Coleman maintain, but also a result of it.

State corporatism

State corporatism, as defined by Schmitter (1974) differs from the other forms in that the state is clearly dominant. The main function of this type of corporatism is not so much to involve private interests in public policy, as well as to provide the state with an instrument of control of society. With this purpose explicit in mind it has been created by an authoritarian state, and was found under fascist regimes. The network structure is highly formalized, it has clear and closed boundaries, membership is legally compulsory, a typical linking pattern is interlocking leadership, it has a high centrality but symmetry is lacking, depoliticization is the convention in such an authoritarian system, delegation of public policy is severely restricted, and legitimacy is questionable.

Sponsored pluralism

A last type, the participation of a larger number of interest organizations in public policy implementation, has been called sponsored pluralism (Lowi, 1979). In this network type, the state supports many interest organizations instead of a select few. This may be done for several reasons. The ideology of

the state (liberalism) or its legal system might not approve of giving certain groups a privilege over others or granting them a representational monopoly, because this in effect comes down to a *de facto* loss of the freedom of association. The state may also believe that nurturing a plurality of interests will ensure the maintenance of its autonomy vis-a-vis particularistic interests, which are valued negatively as threats to the general welfare or the cohesion of the state. Such a network has many properties in common with pressure pluralism. However, it is likely to be unstable, as state support tends to reduce the number of participants over time.

Comparison and conclusion

The discussion of various types of relations between state agencies and organized interests tends to be obscure and confused. Labels have been applied, without being defined and operationalized sufficiently, so as to remove misunderstandings. As a result, different authors have used similar labels to describe different phenomena, or different labels have been used for similar phenomena. What one author considers corporatism, another has called clientelism or sponsored pluralism. As a result, differences of opinion may merely reflect differences in definition. By distinguishing a number of variables in state-civil society relations on which to define and characterize various types of such relations I have tried to elucidate the differences between them and to bring some transparency in the discussion.

Obviously, the number of dimensions presented is too large to provide a good overview of the major differences between the various types of policy networks. Therefore I have selected three dimensions which seem to me to be of particular importance in distinguishing the various types. These are:

1. The number and type of societal actors involved. These may be hardly any (when society is poorly organized); only one major interest group with a representational monopoly; at least two major opposing interests; also involvement of political parties or parliamentary committees; or an unlimited and unspecified number of participants.
2. The major function of the networks. This may be to organize lobbying, or to organize implementation of public policy. The latter may operate either through participation in state regulation or through self regulation, backed by state support. To enable private organizations to assist in implementation they are frequently endowed with formal or *de facto* statutory authority by the state. In terms of another dimension, the strategy of the administrative agency is hence either 'being open to access' only, or also 'delegation of state authority to organized interests'.
3. The balance of power. Are state agencies or societal organizations dom-

Table 2. Typology of policy networks.

Number and type of societal network participants					
Mainly state agencies	One major societal group	Two major conflicting societal groups	Also parties or parliamentary ctees	Large or unlimited number of societal representatives	
<i>Function and power relation</i>					
<i>Only access</i>					
– State agency dominant	Statism/ pantouflage	Statism	Pressure pluralism	Parentela relations	Issue networks
– Interests dominant	Captured statism	Clientelism/ capture	Pressure pluralism	Iron triangles	Issue networks
<i>Also delegation of public authority</i>					
– State agency dominant		(Sector) Corporatism	State corporatism	Parentela relations	Sponsored pluralism
– Interests dominant		(Sector) Corporatism	Corporatist concertation		

inant in the relation? This is of course related to the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis society, a variable which both Cawson et al. (1987) and Atkinson and Coleman (1989) use as a coordinate of their typology-table.

These three dimensions are used as coordinates in Table 2, which attempts to provide an overview of the major differences in types of policy network, found in the literature.

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